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We plan a long-term project sched-ule for which the total budget de-pends upon the year the project
finishes. Each task in the project can begin
only when all its predecessor tasks have
been completed, and each task has a range
of feasible durations with a month-by-
month cost profile for each duration. A task
start can be delayed, but once started for
some chosen duration, a task cannot be
interrupted. Each task suffers some risk of
delay and changed cost. Ignoring budget
constraints, we use Monte Carlo simulation
of the duration of each task in the project to
infer the probability distribution of the
project completion time. We then optimize
a deterministic project schedule following
budget guidance. Finally, we successively
reschedule as the project progresses, simu-
lating annual review of active tasks, and
possibly delaying each active task’s dura-
tion and changing its monthly costs for its
forecast duration. We do not require an
independence assumption, so we can ac-
commodate learning effects from com-
pleted tasks. U.S. Army Future Combat
Systems (FCS) is our motivating applica-
tion. FCS is a complex of information tech-
nologies, sensors, and command systems
expected to require more than a decade and
$16 billion to develop. The U.S. General
Accounting Office finds FCS at significant
risk of cost and schedule growth, and sug-
gests two alternatives to a baseline Army
plan. We analyze these three alternate
project plans for FCS to discover which one
can most likely be completed soonest and
cheapest.
“Now, I’ll manage better this time.” Alice in
Wonderland
INTRODUCTION
U.S. Army Future Combat Systems
(FCS) is a complex of information technol-
ogies, sensors, and command systems con-
stituting a project with scores of tasks ex-
pected to require more than a decade and
$16 billion (2004 U.S. dollars) just in system
development and demonstration costs. In
fiscal year (FY) 2005, FCS is expected to
consume more than half of the U.S. Army’s
budget for all system development and
demonstration, and perhaps $94 billion to
acquire 14 of the 18 systems needed for FCS
initial operational capability by the year
2010 (Brady, 2003; Francis, 2004). The U.S.
General Accounting Office (GAO) (2003)
finds FCS vulnerable to significant cost and
schedule growth, and suggests alternate
project designs to mitigate risk.
Francis (2004) outlines the accomplish-
ments that must be coordinated in order for
FCS to succeed, which we paraphrase:
• A specialized C4ISR (Command, Con-
trol, Communications, Computer, Intel-
ligence, Surveillance, and Reconnais-
sance) network must be developed for
FCS;
• Fourteen major weapon systems and
platforms must be designed and inte-
grated simultaneously with other sys-
tems, subject to physical limitations;
• At least 53 technologies that are consid-
ered critical to achieving required per-
formance capabilities must be matured
and integrated;
• At least 157 Army and joint-forces sys-
tems must also be adapted to interoper-
ate with FCS, which will require the de-
velopment of nearly a hundred new
network interfaces; and
• An estimated 34 million lines of software
code will be required to operate FCS.
This is nearly five times the software
required for the Joint Strike Fighter,
which had the largest software require-
ment of any Department of Defense ac-
quisition prior to FCS.
FCS is so complex, a number of normal
procedural reviews and hurdles have been
relaxed, enabling an independent initial
operational test and evaluation using an
incomplete prototype scheduled for 2008
(Welch, 2003).
We seek a “project design” for such a
long-term, high-risk, complex system. We
anticipate that higher-risk tasks will exhibit
more uncertainty and thus may take longer
than planned and cost more. We are willing
to state probability distributions predicting
the cost and duration of each task, but we
view an independence assumption be-
tween task outcomes as foolhardy: In com-
plex, high-technology projects, trouble
breeds company.
We seek a “robust project schedule”
that offers the least schedule risk. We want
to plan to complete our project at some
given budget, by some given time, with
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some given probability. We can rearrange some
of the planned project partial orders among
tasks—i.e., what predecessor tasks have to be
completed before any given task can start—and
these rearrangements might influence schedule
robustness. Our problem is: which rearrange-
ment offers the most robust project schedule?
SCHEDULE OPTIONS AND
SCHEDULE RISK
We refer to schedule risk as the costs of
schedule overruns evaluated by their likeli-
hoods. Planners might be presented with a set
of options for scheduling the range of tasks that
comprise a large acquisition project. These op-
tions must abide by a common set of temporal
and fiscal constraints. They should also reflect
the inherent uncertainty of the completion time
of a developmental task. A rational planner
assesses the schedule risk of each option and
selects the option that affordably poses the least
risk.
Significant “knowledge demonstration”
(i.e., showing you can actually build compo-
nents that integrate in the system design) often
occurs late in development and early in pro-
duction of a major defense acquisition pro-
gram. The highest schedule risk comes when
developed components must be integrated into
a system of systems. Welch (2003) observes that
the unusual complexity of FCS exposes it to
higher schedule integration risk than normally
expected of a major program. In particular, FCS
is susceptible to “late cycle churn” to fix prob-
lems discovered late in development. Francis
(2004) identifies the following factors that dis-
pose FCS to late cycle churn, which again we
paraphrase:
• Technology development is expected to con-
tinue through to the production decision;
• Technology development will still be ongo-
ing at the design readiness review, putting at
risk the stability of ongoing system integra-
tion;
• Production is planned to start while technol-
ogy development and system integration are
continuing and the first prototypes are being
delivered;
• The final production decision will be made
before some technologies reach their re-
quired maturation and before an integrated
system demonstration has been conducted;
• Production delivery will start before the
Army has completed the first full demonstra-
tion of FCS as an integrated system; and
• The full-rate production decision will be
made while testing and demonstration are
continuing.
The FCS program executive office has pre-
pared a baseline project plan (i.e., a schedule
with funding) for the system development and
demonstration phase that governs current ac-
quisition policy. Several alternate project plans
have been proposed by the General Accounting
Office (2003) to mitigate FCS schedule risks. We
examine the baseline plan and two of the GAO
alternatives here.
1. “FCS baseline” plan
The baseline plan develops all major sub-
systems concurrently, rather than developing
one first to set the development context for
follow-on systems. The FCS program executive
office acknowledges that this plan is ambitious,
and that the program was not ready for system
development and demonstration when it was
approved (Francis, 2004).
2. “GAO risk first” plan
This plan modifies the baseline to address
risky technologies up front, requiring that the
technology readiness level (a gauge of comple-
tion) be “at least 6” to pass intermediate review
and “at least 7” to qualify for production
(Wynne, 2003). Many key technologies are be-
low the 6 threshold, and the FCS program ex-
ecutive office has already developed risk-miti-
gation strategies for each. This GAO suggestion
first matures technologies that are below the
technical readiness-6 threshold, and then pro-
ceeds as scheduled in the baseline plan. The
advantage is that test and integration tasks oc-
cur later in the schedule, with theoretically re-
duced schedule risk compared to the baseline
plan.
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3. “GAO C4ISR first” plan
This plan modifies the baseline to develop
C4ISR tasks before all others. The C4ISR com-
ponents are believed to pose the greatest sched-
ule risks to FCS development due to their scope
and complexity. They are expected to require
about 16 million lines of software code (of the
34 million total estimated), of which more than
half will be new code (Welch, 2003). This huge
undertaking is vulnerable to cost and schedule
overruns. By investing early in these compo-
nents, subsequent C4ISR test and integration
tasks should pose less risk than in the baseline.
Key distinctions between these alternate
plans are that the partial orders among tasks
may change between plans and any task com-
mon to all of the plans may be allocated differ-
ent risk levels in each. For instance, “system
integration and testing” is high-risk in the
“baseline plan” because immature technologies
must be concurrently developed and inte-
grated, but this same task has lower risk in the
“GAO risk first” plan.
The three alternate plans displayed in the
Appendix use nominal (i.e., unclassified, non-
proprietary) FCS task data provided by the
Cost Analysis Improvement Group, Program
Analysis and Evaluation (PAE), Office of the
Secretary of Defense.
TIME FIDELITY
Monthly time fidelity suffices for purposes
of long-term planning and budgeting, although
it is also customary to offer annual budget ac-
counting for such plans and perhaps to conduct
annual reviews of task progress. Indeed, annual
task reviews are the most substantive control
points in such projects, given that they are tied
to annual budget authorizations. Accordingly,
we plan all activities and events in months, but
make annual task-state reviews with possible
consequences on task duration and time.
EVALUATE EACH “PROJECT
DESIGN” FOUR WAYS
We were asked to analyze the FCS baseline
plan and the two GAO alternatives. The follow-
ing is essentially a series of project reports as
we went back to our PAE sponsor with inter-
mediate results, seeking guidance for the next
steps to try. We do not recount a lot of ideas
that did not work. Overall, we spent 8 person-
weeks with PAE, and 24 person-weeks finding
out what works, and what doesn’t. Remember:
the goal here is discovering new, effective ways to
improve cost estimation for this huge, complex
project, not manage it.
First, we just find the deterministic project
duration (i.e., the “shortest longest path length”
in time, or simply the “critical path length.”).
This is easy, and exercises our newly-com-
pleted scenario data sets. We are still debug-
ging and scrubbing data.
Then, we ignore costs and budgets, but
assert probability distributions for task dura-
tions and apply Monte Carlo simulation to
evaluate the critical path induced from each
sampled project instance. The statistics we
gather, and experience we gain, helps us un-
derstand the behavior of each project design,
especially the partial orders among tasks.
Next, we provide a list of total project du-
rations in years and a total program budget for
achieving each of these durations. We specify
the year-by-year spending goal of any selected
project duration. Each task can be started only
when all its predecessors in the project design
have been completed. Each task can be started
for any of a range of durations in months, and
each of these durations has a monthly cost pro-
file. Once a task is started, it cannot be inter-
rupted. However, a task start can be delayed
for lack of available budget(s) sufficient to sup-
port its chosen, uninterrupted duration once
started. We optimize this deterministic, cost-
constrained project schedule to minimize total
project duration.
We note that “costs” need not be strictly
expressed in constant-dollar allocations, but
can include policy penalties rewarding desir-
able outcomes (i.e., finishing earlier), or penal-
izing bad ones (i.e., finishing very late). But,
although completion time is a concern, the
over-arching constraint will be total obligation
authority (i.e., money) committed to the pro-
gram.
Finally, we nest our cost-constrained
project schedule optimization within an annual
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state review simulation of each active task (i.e.,
task in progress at time of review). At each
annual review, each active task may be delayed
depending on a probability distribution that
depends on the risk of that task, or on any prior
experience with any other task. So, year-by-year,
we conduct an annual state review of all the
active tasks, then reoptimize the remaining
planning horizon. This takes a lot of computa-
tion, but the insights are worth the effort.
RELATED RESEARCH
Malcolm, Roseboom, Clark, and Fazar
(1959) introduce Program Evaluation and Re-
view Technique and Critical Path Method
(PERT-CPM) developed for the Polaris fleet
ballistic missile program, and Kelly (1961, Kelly
1963) provides a mathematical foundation. Wi-
est (1964) highlights two key shortcomings in
CPM at its nascent stage: it only considers con-
stant task durations and does not recognize
resource constraints.
More recent concepts of CPM allow for
greater flexibility in these areas, for example by
allowing tasks to be scheduled in either “regu-
lar time” (with nominal costs) or in “crash
time” (with higher costs), and by allowing cost
constraints. Even with these innovations the
concept of a “task” remains unitary in nature.
At a fixed point in time of the project, tasks that
are underway are not subject to decisions that
affect their remaining times until completion.
If each task duration is random, and some
deterministic equivalent time is used in CPM,
estimates of project duration are generally op-
timistic as Fulkerson (1962) demonstrates using
discrete random task durations. A task not on a
critical path using mean durations may be on
the critical path with positive probability when
its duration is treated as a random variable.
Dodin (1984) reports upper and lower bounds
on project duration when task durations are
independent random variables, and uses the
Central Limit Theorem to justify treating the
project duration as approximately normally
distributed. While this assumption offers trac-
tability, the longest random-length path is nei-
ther normally distributed in theory, nor in prac-
tice (as can be verified by simple Monte Carlo
simulation), and this assumption can give mis-
leading results.
Resource constraints are admitted by Bow-
man (1958), who introduces linear program-
ming for CPM, and Senju and Toyoda (1968)
and Pritsker, Watters, and Wolfe (1969) state
integer-linear programs representing discrete
decisions. Demeulemeester and Herroelen
(2002) present formulations of resource-con-
strained project scheduling problems and re-
view solution methods.
Using linear and integer linear programs to
represent stochastic models has a long history.
Babbar, Tintner, and Heady (1955), Tintner
(1955, Tintner 1960), and Sengupta, Tintner,
and Morrison (1963) show how to embed opti-
mization within Monte Carlo simulation. Task
duration may be treated as a random variable
with a distribution not completely known (Her-
roelen, Reyck, and Demeulemeester, 1998). Fac-
tors influencing these random variables include
resource availability, scheduling of deliveries,
modification of due dates, and changes in
project scope that might imply the cancellation
or addition of future tasks (Herroelen and Leus,
2004).
Generally, the increased realism of stochas-
tic PERT-CPM modeling comes at the price of
increased analytic abstraction and computa-
tional cost. Deterministic equivalent objectives,
such as the expected project critical path length
or expected costs that include penalties for vi-
olating constraints (Gutjahr, Stauss, and Wag-
ner, 2000), may be easy enough to state and
solve, but the risk of such solutions is much
more difficult to gauge, even given generous
independence assumptions.
If task duration is random and not inde-
pendent of other task durations, the distribu-
tion of the total project duration is difficult to
characterize (Yang, Geunes, and O’Brien, 2001).
An independence assumption is often made to
render tractable analysis, but this assumption is
not realistic. An optimal deterministic schedule
typically has insufficient slack to remain opti-
mal (or even feasible) in an uncertain setting,
and thus lacks robustness (Herroelen, 2004). A
trivial example with two identical, parallel
tasks, each with random duration, reveals this
property.
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In addition, managers want the flexibility
to change their scheduling decisions as the
project evolves. Full dynamic scheduling offers
decision points at task completions (Igelmund
and Radermacher, 1983).
We need resource (essentially budget) con-
straints and we cannot ignore uncertainty. Of
all these historical contributions, we admire
Tintner’s works most for their originality, ele-
gance, and simplicity, and we follow his advice:
for the stochastic modeling, use Monte Carlo
identity simulation, and then use optimization
for each random realization.
Finally, we do assume, as does PERT-CPM,
that each task is separable and distinct from all
others. In our case, these tasks are subcontracts,
so this is true in law as well as in fact: If you
want to re-define tasks, you must re-negotiate
contracts.
FIND SHORTEST PROJECT
COMPLETION DATE FOR EACH
ALTERNATE PLAN WITH NO
BUDGET CONSTRAINT
To check our alternate project plans to see if
we get schedules that make sense, we ignore
budget constraints and just solve a determinis-
tic CPM problem.
Given a project network with fixed task
durations, we wrote a Java (Sun Microsystems,
2005) procedure for an unconstrained reaching
algorithm to search the project tasks over their
adjacencies in partial order to find the comple-
tion time of the project. The completion time is
the length of a longest path from project start to
finish. This is one of the simplest network al-
gorithms (e.g., see topological sorting and
reaching in Ahuja et al., 1993, pp. 107–108),
with worst-case runtime linear in the number
of partial orders.
From a project start in January 2003, this
primitive deterministic analysis yields an earli-
est project completion date of October 2012, for
the “FCS baseline plan.” The Army wants to
field its first unit in September 2012, so this is
reassuring.
Given that we can solve each of these de-
terministic problems in less than a millisecond,
we suggested solving thousands of these prob-
lems in a Monte Carlo simulation to assess
stochastic elements of each project alternative.
PAE agreed.
MONTE-CARLO SIMULATE TASK
DURATIONS FOR EACH ALTERNATE
PLAN WITH NO BUDGET
CONSTRAINT
The three-parameter Weibull distribution is
often used to model the duration of develop-
mental tasks for cost estimation and planning.
Law and Kelton (2000, p. 376) explain the rea-
soning for the use of this distribution. The
Weibull reliability function:
Rx; , ,   ex  , x 
is completely characterized by its three non-
negative parameters. An absolute minimum
task duration is given by . For   1, the
Weibull density has a mode strictly greater
than , and this mode appeals managerially as
the task duration of maximum likelihood. The
Weibull also features more and larger devia-
tions from the mode in the positive direction.
Miller (2003) offers a convenient procedure
for specifying the parameters of a three-param-
eter Weibull distribution from intuitive proper-
ties of task duration. We need a value for the
duration mode, xM, (for this, we just use the
longest admissible task duration) and a catego-
rization of the risk level as high, medium, or
low. Miller suggests high risk for unprece-
dented tasks, medium for development and
some new integration tasks, and low for rou-
tine, repetitive, or well-understood tasks. Each
risk level is associated with fixed values of two
attributes of the task duration that together
with with the mode xM are sufficient to deter-
mine all three parameters of the Weibull. At-
tribute RM  xM/ is the ratio of the mode to
the minimum duration and PM  P(X  xM) is
the probability that the duration exceeds the
mode. Miller suggests for (risk, RM, PM) the
values (high, 1.25, 0.8), (medium, 1.20, 0.7), or
(low, 1.15, 0.6). PAE concurs.
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The three-parameter Weibull distribution
can be defined using either triplet (, , ) or
(RM, xM, PM). Table 1 shows the mapping be-
tween these equivalent descriptions. For exam-
ple, a medium-risk task with most-likely dura-
tion xM  36 months is endowed with RM 








1  ln0.7 1.554, and  
36
1.20 30.0.
In consultation with PAE, we truncate our
Weibull at its 90th percentile to avoid unrealis-
tically-long project durations. The maximum
allowable duration truncation point is calcu-
lated dMax    [ln(0.1)]
1/. Such a Weibull
is trivial to generate from a unit-uniform vari-
ate U via X    [ln(1  .9U)]1/.
We compare the three FCS project plans
(baseline, GAO risk first, and GAO C4ISR first)
ignoring cost constraints. For each simulated
iteration, new task durations are sampled from
their Weibull probability distributions and the
resulting project completion time is recorded.
The simulation is repeated for 60,000 iterations
(i.e., we commit about a minute of computing
time to each case). We thus induce the random
distribution of project completion time for each
project plan. Results from these simulations ap-
pear in Figure 1.
OPTIMIZE A BUDGET-CONSTRAINED
DETERMINISTIC SCHEDULE
Our real-world project has a budget and
costs that may be influenced by the rate at
which we work to finish tasks. We adopt
monthly planning fidelity. For each task, we
introduce a set of discretionary task durations
where each duration has its own month-by-
month cost profile for completing the task. Our
total project budget depends on the finish year
we choose, where each candidate finish year
induces a completely independent set of year-
by-year budget guidelines. These generaliza-
tions suggest an optimization model to identify
the least expensive feasible project completion
time. We discretize the starting times for tasks
and task durations to months, and to use the
following integer linear program to suggest a
project schedule:
Index Use [	cardinality]
y  Y Fiscal year (alias yh, yf)
[	20]
i  I Task (alias j) [	200]
  I Distinguished, last task
in project
(i, j)  A Pairwise partial order:
task i must be completed
before task j starts
m  M Planning month [	240]
m  M (y) Month in fiscal year y
s  si  Si  M Start month for task i
d  di  Di Task i duration in
months
1  pi  di Months since start of
ongoing task i
Given Data [units]
budgety,yf, budgety,yf Lower and upper cost
range during fiscal
year y if program
finishes in fiscal year
yf [cost]
costidp Cost of ongoing task i
with duration d
Table 1. Association between attributes and
parameters of the three-parameter Weibull
distribution show how to map from attributes to














PM  e11/  
xM
RM
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during elapsed month
p [cost]










Qyf  1 if finish
year of program


































Xisd  1 	 i  I
(F2)
Xsd  Qyf 	 yf  Y,s  S,d  D∧s  d
 1 M yf  (F3)

yfY
Qyf  1 (F4)
Figure 1. Sixty-thousand samples of each alternate project plan are depicted. There are no cost constraints and
each task duration is generated independently from a Weibull distribution reflecting its risk in that plan. “GAO
risk first” is the most desirable plan with the highest probability of an early completion time, while the baseline
plan has the lowest probability of successful completion at any given time.
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 Xjsjdj 	 i, j  A, sj  Sj, dj  Dj
∧sj  dj  1  M∧sj 
 MIN
sSidDi
s  d  1
(F7)
Xisd  0, 1 	 i  I, s  Si, d  Di
(F8)
Qyf  0, 1 	 yf  Y (F9)
UNDERy  0,SLACKy  0, OVERy
 0 	 y  Y (F10)
Verbal Description
The overarching goal is to decide how long
the project should take to complete. The objec-
tive function (F1) expresses total planned
project duration in months, plus an elastic pen-
alty term for any violation of cumulative bud-
get ranges over the planning horizon. Each par-
tition constraint (F2) requires that exactly one
start month and duration be selected for each
task. Each constraint (F3) permits the last
project task to be completed in a fiscal year only
if that fiscal year has been selected for project
completion. Constraint (F4) requires that ex-
actly one project completion year be selected.
Each constraint (F5) accumulates expenditures
from the first fiscal year through a current fiscal
year and determines whether the cumulative
budget ranges have been satisfied, or violated.
(This cumulant form is amenable to both a lin-
ear programming solver and to managerial in-
terpretation: Brown et al., 1997.) Each con-
straint (F6) limits cumulative slack budget by
the hard constraints on yearly program budget
determined by finish year. Each constraint (F7)
ensures, for a pair of tasks adjacent in prece-
dence, that the predecessor task must be com-
pleted before the successor task can start. Vari-
able domains are defined by (F8–F10). (F8) can
restrict admissible start months for each task
and the admissible durations of each task.
TASK DURATIONS AND COSTS
For a task started in month s for duration d
months, we can assert any month-by-month
cost distribution we want, even including costs
for months preceding task start or following
task completion (as military research and de-
velopment often requires: Brown et al., 2004).
Here (following explicit guidance from PAE),
we simplify: no matter when a task might start
for a d-month duration, we allocate its Task-
_Costd over each month of this duration with a
Rayleigh distribution truncated at its 97-th per-




YEAR HAS ITS OWN BUDGET
The key policy question is (always) “how
much are we willing to spend and when are we
willing to spend it to finish our project (e.g., by
the end of any given future fiscal year)?” Are
we willing to spend more for a quicker comple-
tion? Are there competing projects that restrict
our planned spending pattern? For planning
purposes, sooner or later we have to at least
estimate upper and lower limits on the overall
planned project budget for each financial year
of each planned project duration. Here, for any
candidate project completion year and budget,
we also use a Rayleigh distribution to distribute
this budget year-by-year.
A complex, long-term military project
rarely meets all its planned budget targets.
Sometimes allocated funds are available before
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they can be used and sometimes costs exceed
projections. Accordingly, we accumulate any
year-by-year over-expenditure or under-expen-
diture, but penalize any such cumulative viola-
tion year-by-year until the surplus or deficit is
repaired. The idea (Brown et al., 2004) is to
allow some reasonable flexibility in program
management, while showing good faith adher-
ing to overall project budget guidance.
FCS ANNUAL BUDGETS
An FCS project budget estimate has been
developed with help from PAE. Separate esti-
mates must be prepared for each feasible
project duration, ranging from FY2010 to
FY2016. Table 2 shows the minimum, planned
and maximum annual budgets for a FY2011
completion that has been Rayleigh-allocated
over the planning years.
Preparing budgets for each completion
year, we try to follow the best guidance avail-
able. For example, a GAO review of FCS (Fran-
cis, 2004) concludes that a one-year delay in
FCS would increase costs by $4 billion to $5
billion (during the system development and
demonstration, and production phases). Rela-
tive to the total projected cost of FCS, this rep-
resents a 0.5% cost overrun per year of delay.
Conversely, Lee (1997) estimates for projects in
general that accelerating the pace of work and
decreasing a project duration by one year
would require an increased budget of 0.2%. Of
course, delays in any accelerated plan subject it
to cost overruns as well.
SUPERIMPOSE MONTE CARLO
SIMULATION OF ANNUAL TASK
REVIEWS (WITH POSSIBLE TASK
DELAYS AND COST CHANGES) ON
SCHEDULE OPTIMIZATION
We nest our cost-constrained project sched-
ule optimization within a simulated annual
“project review” of each then-active task. Each
reviewed active task may be delayed depend-
ing on a probability distribution that depends
on the risk of that task, or on any prior experience
with any other task. The cost of each reviewed
task may also change, as can the forecast cost or
duration of any future task. Each annual project
review is followed by a re-optimization of the
remaining future planning horizon. Year-by-
year, we conduct an annual project review, re-
optimize, and so forth. Figure 2 illustrates how
this simulation might progress.
In our simple example, each active task
reviewed is delayed with (risk, probability, and
delay) of (high, 0.5, 140%); (medium, 0.3, 120%);
or (low, 0.2, 110%), and a delayed task’s costs
Table 2. For a project completion in FY2011, a nominal total FCS system development and demonstration
budget of 20.04 billion 2004 dollars has been Rayleigh-allocated by fiscal year. These planned annual
budgets are goals, but the minimum (20%) and maximum (105%) budget ranges are hard constraints. The
sums of annual expenditures from FY2003 through any given year are constrained by these cumulative hard
constraints. Within these hard cumulative limits, any cumulative expenditure under- or over-plan is
penalized and carried forward to the next year, where it will be penalized again if not mitigated.
Year Minimum Budget ($ Million) Planned Budget ($ Million) Maximum Budget ($ Million)
FY2003 $ 175 $ 875 $ 919
FY2004 482 2,410 2,530
FY2005 676 3,382 3,551
FY2006 732 3,658 3,841
FY2007 667 3,335 3,502
FY2008 530 2,652 2,785
FY2009 374 1,871 1,965
FY2010 237 1,183 1,242
FY2011 135 674 708
TOTAL $4,008 $20,040 $21,042
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increase with (risk, probability, change) of
(high, 0.5, 150%), (medium 0.3, 130%), or (low,
0.2, 110%). As a practical matter, we permit a
task to be delayed to, at most, twice its original
duration (longer than this and the task would
likely be cancelled, and the project redesigned).
If an annual review extends the remaining
optimized project duration, the total project
budget changes accordingly (here, it is in-
creased in proportion to the length of the ex-
tended duration, though any adjustment is ad-
missible).
This amalgam of annual budget review
simulation and optimization of the remaining
planning horizon offers a face-valid emulation
of actual practice, and our Monte Carlo annual
simulation can easily be replaced with a human
umpire if more expert control and judgment
appeal. We have tested dependent models for
inflating costs and task durations, and two key
lessons emerge: even mildly inter-task depen-
dent delays cause havoc, and any project over-
seer would intervene long before these results
played out. Although we could model decreases
in task duration and/or cost, this prospect has
never come up with PAE, nor have we ever
observed such a signal event in our careers.
IMPLEMENTING THE OPTIMIZATION
MODELS
The alternate project plans have been set up
in Microsoft Project (2004). We want to use the
graphical user interface offered by Project, as well
as its integration with the MS Office Suite. Our
Figure 2. Each annual review (depicted top-to-bottom separating the shaded and un-shaded portions of each
timeline row) may delay any currently-active task (i.e., any highlighted task spanning shaded and un-shaded
timelines), or change its cost. After each annual review, the remaining schedule is re-optimized with monthly
fidelity, subject to annual budget goals induced by the best project duration still achievable. The optimization
must complete currently-active tasks as specified by the latest annual review, but can choose any admissible
start month for any future task and choose any future admissible task duration it pleases, as long as the
associated costs of the chosen duration are bearable. Directed arcs between partially-ordered task pairs and
nominal Rayleigh-distributed task budgets are shown to illustrate how the optimization must schedule tasks
such that total expenditures follow annual budget guidance.
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optimization (with optional Monte Carlo annual
reviews) is been implemented in the algebraic
modeling language GAMS (Brook et al., 1998).
Each scenario is presented to GAMS as two
input scripts, one for tasks, and the other for
budgets. The former script has a descriptor for
each task specifying each candidate start
month, duration in months, and cost. Nobody
will use an optimization model they can’t con-
trol, so this script (via the Project interface) lets
a planner completely control alternatives, in-
cluding “start this task in this month for this
duration at this cost.”
As you would expect, the GAMS script im-
ports a scenario from Project, solves it, and re-
turns the solution for display and analysis. But,
the majority of our GAMS script is devoted to
diagnosis and exigent report writing, to better
monitor the behavior of our experimental mod-
els.
For instance, early experience with our
model revealed that although we offer precise
controls for task start times and durations, no-
body used these: by default, each task can start
any time for any admissible duration. As a
consequence, an enormous number of alternate
task start variables was generated. Solvers me-
chanically detect and remove redundant model
features. However, such “presolve” features do
not tell you what they have removed, or why.
And, presolve will not identify all redundan-
cies: each reduction involves no more than re-
moving one redundant variable with an equa-
tion substitution. You can’t be sure you have
removed the redundancies you worry about
unless you filter them out yourself.
So, in addition to the index domain filtering
that clutters the summations in our formulation
(but makes our intent clear), we formulated an
auxiliary, trivial optimization (not displayed) to
find the admissible start times and durations
for each task.
We work on our formulation and model
generator until presolve finds as little as possi-
ble left to remove. After such filtering, a typical
scenario consists of about 53 thousand con-
straints, and 19 thousand variables, almost all
binary. We would expect such an integer linear
program to solve on a laptop in minutes.
We used CPLEX 9.0 (ILOG, 2004). Default
CPLEX stalled, and could not find an initial
feasible integer solution. We provided an ad-
missible integer starting point from our trivial
presolve. CPLEX bogged down in problem pre-
processing and integer cut generation. Eventu-
ally, to get CPLEX to work, we had do disable
most of its default options for cut generation
and root node heuristics.
Our solve times are still longer than we
expected. If we fix project duration and budget,
the resulting optimization model is easier to
solve (and we can automate this fixing in
GAMS for each project duration we fancy).
However, even this simplifying restriction
leaves us with a daunting scheduling problem:
to choose a start time and duration for each task
that satisfies every partial order between tasks,
maximally complies with the cumulative bud-
get guidance, and also finishes on time. Typi-
cally, it takes us 3 GHz-hours to resolve to a
10% integrality gap.
These integer linear programs may be hard
to solve, but they convey remarkable insight we
have not gained by any other means. ILP mod-
els depend on well-defined assumptions and of-
fer fidelity that closely mimics real-world plan-
ning, and they also convey an objective
assessment of solution quality that, for instance,
lets us confidently compare alternate scenarios.
For instance, the objective assessment of
solution quality we get from the integer linear
programs is invaluable when comparing two
competing alternatives: given assumptions stated
clearly, and data defined commensurately, no
matter how complex the project, if the optimized
solutions exhibit integrality gaps that do not in-
tersect, we can confidently declare a winner.
RESULTS AND CONCLUSION
A Rayleigh-distributed project budget just
does not fit the needs of the constituent FCS
tasks as the project proceeds for any alternate
project plan. Accordingly, we state the budget
as a cumulative goal from project start in
FY2003 through each year, with any cumulative
under- or over-expenditure carried forward to
later years, charging a penalty for any deviation
from cumulative budget until that violation is
rectified. Without this flexibility, we must ex-
tend the project finish year and leave Rayleigh-
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allocated funds for intermediate years unused.
For long-term planning, this makes no sense at
all. Figure 3 shows how the deterministic, op-
timized plans use the Rayleigh-distributed
project budget, and displays the same expendi-
tures in cumulative terms.
Starting the “baseline plan” in January
2003, we find a (cumulative) cost-constrained
schedule that finishes just as quickly as primi-
tive CPM with no cost constraints at all: Octo-
ber 2012. Our nominal task costs and total bud-
get restrictions just suffice without delaying the
project: this is another reassuring discovery.
And, our suggested cumulative expenditure
history follows long-term guidance closely.
When we simulate annual reviews, with
task delays, the optimized project plans take a
lot longer to complete (see Figure 4). Monte
Carlo delays of task durations as the project
proceeds extend achievable project completion,
so the projected budget (discovered year-by-
year as the project progresses and these delays
arise) is characterized by transitions to succes-
sively longer finish-year budgets (see Figure 5).
For the baseline plan, just introducing ran-
dom Monte Carlo task durations increases the
median project duration by about 10%. If bud-
get constraints are imposed in addition to ran-
dom task delays, estimated project duration
rises by about 39%. For FCS, a 39% delay cor-
responds to approximately four years, where a
one-year delay has been estimated by the GAO
to add between $4 billion and $5 billion to the
total acquisition cost.
In the absence of budget constraints, miti-
gating the technologies below the required ma-
turity level prior to other tasks (GAO risk first)
leads to project completion faster than the base-
line plan. When budget constraints are added,
this plan maintains its advantage although it is
subject to delays similar to the baseline plan.
Table 3 assembles FCS project duration es-
timates for each alternate plan and from each of
our models. With no budget constraint, it’s best
to mitigate high-risk technology first. With
project budget constraints, both the baseline
and risk-first plans are attractive, but with an-
nual review simulation, the GAO C4ISR first
plan turns out to be least vulnerable to delay.
Given the high risk of the FCS program, we
prefer the behavior of GAO C4ISR first.
FCS is a long, complex, technically risky,
expensive, and important project. But, FCS is not
unique in these respects: there are (always)
other defense projects that are comparable
(Brown et al., 2004). Based on our planning
experience with such projects, we recom-
mend a high-level assessment such as that
presented here to forecast as early as possible
and as well as possible where the fragilities
Figure 3. A Rayleigh-distributed budget for a FY2012 project finish is shown in annual and cumulative terms
along with deterministic, optimized expenditures for each alternate project plan. The budget is stated as a
cumulative goal from project start in FY2003 through each year, with any cumulative under- or over-expendi-
ture carried forward to later years, charging a penalty for any deviation from cumulative budget goal until that
violation is rectified. Note the banking of unused budget (e.g., in FY2007) in anticipation of borrowing it back
(e.g., in FY2010). Without this flexibility, we must extend the project years beyond FY2012 and leave allocated
funds for intermediate years unused. For long-term planning, this makes no sense at all.
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and vulnerabilities are in an overall project
plan, and to prescribe work-arounds sooner,
rather than later.
We emphasize key, distinguishing, real-
world advantages offered here. These compo-
nent models are easy to discuss, illustrate, brief,
and understand: Project scheduling and prim-
itive Monte Carlo simulation are ubiquitous.
We co-opt the graphical user interface of a
project management system and its data base,
and embed the optimizer and Monte Carlo re-
views, thereby producing a visually-appealing
planning product at a low per-seat cost. The em-
bedding of deterministic optimization within
time-phased simulation decouples the two in a
way that requires few simplifying assumptions
and that invites very basic, intuitive analysis to
evaluate results. We closely mimic real-world be-
havior:
• each optimization decision offers to start a
task for some duration on some cost sched-
ule, and this corresponds directly to contract
terms we must commit; and
• simulated annual review of each then-ac-
tive task state can depend on any prior
learning, but, more importantly, this de-
pendence can be described in simple, intu-
itive terms of the facts already in hand for
the review.
Figure 4. Annual expenditures are shown for optimized FCS project schedules with a simulated annual review
of each then-active task that, depending on task risk, may randomly induce a delay and a cost increase. As
expected, project completion is delayed for all project plans, and costs rise (by about four years and $600 million,
respectively). The idea is to animate how these task delays arise over time and how they cascade and influence
other competing or succeeding tasks. Note that GAO C4ISR finishes two years before the other plans.
Figure 5. For the baseline plan, as the project
progresses year-by-year and is subjected to annual
reviews that delay then-active tasks, the remaining
project tasks are reoptimized and the project takes
longer to complete. This shifts the best achievable
project budget to a later year. The display shows
when the optimization must jump to a larger and
longer budget.
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EPILOG
Time will tell whether our work proves
prescient for FCS. We have delivered presenta-
tions to the Cost Analysis Improvement Group,
Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, and thank them, espe-
cially Mr. Walter Cooper, for their continued
encouragement and support. Grose (2004) ex-
hibits additional underlying detail. Since this
writing, a number of revisions to the FCS pro-
gram and its nominal schedule have already
arisen, and these are reported in the open press,
where we direct interested readers.
Table 3. Deterministic CPM gives a lower bound for each plan duration. Monte Carlo CPM, here using for
each task an independent Weibull task time based only on that task’s risk, shows the delaying influence of
task time variability on the median project duration for 60,000 samples of each schedule plan. Deterministic
optimized plans honor project budget goals and show the delaying influence of doing so. Optimized plans
with Monte-Carlo annual reviews show the combined delaying effects of task time variability and budget
goals. For reference, a start in January 2003 for 118 months yields a finish in October 2012.
Schedule Plan
Estimated FCS Program Durations in Months
No Budget Constraint
Project Budget Constraint by
Fiscal Year Completed, and
Allocated Yearly







Baseline 118 150 118 164
GAO Risk First 116 126 116 162
GAO C4ISR First 129 139 130 145
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APPENDIX: THREE ALTERNATE PLANS FOR FCS SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT AND
DEMONSTRATION








1 Notional Start 0.00 0 24,13,3
2 Major Events
3 Milestone B Complete 0.00 0 4,67,37,29,25,14
4 SFR (System Functional Review) 0.00 0 5,16,26
5 SoS PDR Complete 0.00 0 6,17
6 SoS CDR Complete 0.00 0 7
7 Facilitation 0.00 0 8,95
8 LL IPR Waiver 0.00 0 9,97
9 IPD (Milestone C) 0.00 0 10,77
10 IOC 0.00 0 11,32
11 UA 0.00 0 101
12 SoS Definition and Design
13 Systems Engineering 571.42 104 5
14 Systems Design 1,428.57 260 10
15 Prototype Systems Build and Test
16 1st Variant PDC (Preliminary Design
Complete)
0.00 0 17
17 Last Variant PDC (Preliminary Design
Complete)
0.00 0 18,20,44
18 Long Lead Prototype 800.00 52 19,21
19 Prototype Integration and Assembly 1,200.00 78 22
20 First Variant CDC (Critical Design Complete) 0.00 0 69,21
21 Last Variant CDC (Critical Design Complete) 0.00 0 22,6
22 Final Prototype 0.00 0 97,8
23 C4ISR Software and Platform
24 SW Build 1 507.93 104 27,44
25 SW Build 2 634.92 130 27,34,69,31,46,52,59
26 SW Build 3 825.39 169 28,52,59
27 SW Build 4 571.42 117 9,63,59
28 SW Build 5 507.93 104 83,89,64
29 SIL Delivery 1 (System Integration Lab) 253.96 52 68,33,30
30 SIL Delivery 2 253.96 52 69,31,27,52
31 SIL Delivery 3 253.96 52 32,28
32 SW Update 190.47 39 11,80
33 Software PDR Complete 0.00 0 34,5
34 Software CDR Complete 0.00 0 6
35 Integrated Test Program
36 IPS1 (Integration Phase SDD 1)
37 SoSIL Development 280.99 51 38,39,30
38 Integration 71.62 13 41,5,40
39 Sims Delivered 0.00 0 40
40 IT and UT 71.62 13 42
41 TRR 0.00 0 42
42 Analysis 71.62 13 45,44
43 IPS2
44 Integration 280.99 51 47,6,46
45 Early Emulators Delivered 0.00 0 46
46 IT/UT 71.62 13 48
47 TRR 0.00 0 48
48 Analysis 71.62 13 50,51,28
49 IPS3
50 Integration 209.36 38 53,52
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51 Initial DP Prime Items Delivered 0.00 0 52
52 IT and UT 71.62 13 54,55
53 TRR 0.00 0 54,55
54 Analysis 104.68 19 58,8
55 User Trial 11.01 2 57
56 IPS4
57 Integration 187.32 34 60,59
58 Initial System Deliveries 0.00 0 59
59 IT and UT 71.62 13 61,63,72
60 TRR 0.00 0 61
61 Analysis 71.62 13 9
62 IPS5
63 Integration 209.37 38 64
64 IMT 71.63 13 65
65 Analysis 71.63 13 77,100
66 SoS Testing and Integration
67 Phase 1: Integration and Test SDD (Simulation) 183.75 78 70,5
68 Phase 2: HW and SW 214.37 91 6,95
69 Phase 3: Prototype 214.37 91 72,57,8
70 Integration and Qualification and Live Fire
Tests
489.99 208 73,9,76
71 Test Events and Milestones
72 LUT 1 4.71 2 73
73 LUT 2 4.71 2 77,79,74,98,99
74 IOT (Initial Operational Test) Phase 1 47.11 20 10,75
75 IOT Phase 2 44.76 19 80
76 Integration and Test Production 214.37 91 10,80
77 FUSL 244.99 104 80,11
78 Training and Fielding 244.99 104 80
79 IOTE 1 61.25 26 80
80 IOTE 2 30.62 13 11
81 Combat Systems Testing
82 Phase 1: LRIP Prime Items
83 Integration 634.15 39 85,89,100
84 LRIP PI for SoSIL 0.00 0 85
85 LRIP PI for TFT Delivered 0.00 0 86
86 Testing 211.38 13 87,90
87 Analysis 211.38 13 92,74,79
88 Phase 2: LRIP Late LRIP PI
89 Integration 520.33 32 91
90 LRIP PI for SoSIL 0.00 0 91
91 LRIP PI for TFT Delivered 0.00 0 92
92 Testing 211.38 13 93
93 Analysis 211.38 13 11,10,32
94 Production
95 Facilitation (Pre-LL Production) 682.93 52 100,84,96
96 Facilitation (LL Production) 1,195.12 91 100,84
97 Long Lead Lot 1 682.93 52 98,99,100,9,83,84,76
98 Lot 1 1,024.39 78 79,78
99 Lot 2 1,707.32 130 11,80
100 Lot 3 1,707.32 130 11,80
101 Notional End Task 0 0
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APPENDIX: GAO “Risk First”: Mitigate High Risk Technologies First





1 Notional Start 0.00 0 57,13,3
2 Major Events
3 Milestone B Complete 0.00 0 4,100,70,62,58,14
4 SFR (System Functional Review) 0.00 0 5,49,59
5 SoS PDR Complete 0.00 0 6,50
6 SoS CDR Complete 0.00 0 7
7 Facilitation 0.00 0 8,128
8 LL IPR Waiver 0.00 0 9,130
9 IPD (Milestone C) 0.00 0 10,110
10 IOC 0.00 0 11,65
11 UA 0.00 0 134
12 SoS Definition and Design
13 Systems Engineering 571.43 104 5
14 Systems Design 1,428.57 260 10
15 Prototype Systems Build and Test
16 TRL Mitigation (Technology Readiness Level)
17 KPP 1: Joint Interoperability
18 Interface and Information Exchange 113.24 65 4
19 KPP 2: Networked Battle Command
20 Security Systems and Algorithms 249.13 143 6
21 Quality of Service Algorithms 67.94 39 3
22 Wideband Waveforms 181.18 104 5
23 Multispectral Sensors and Seekers 90.59 52 3
24 Combat Identification 22.65 13 3
25 Sensor and Data Fusion and Data Compression 67.94 39 3
26 KPP 3: Networked Lethality
27 Dynamic Sensor-Shooter Pairing and Fire Control 90.59 52 3
28 LOS and BLOS and NLOS Precision Munitions
Guidance
271.78 156 6
29 Aided Target Recognition 67.94 39 3
30 Auto Target Recognition 181.18 104 5
31 Recoil Management and Lightweight
Components
90.59 52 3
32 Distributed Collaboration of Manned and
Unmanned Vehicles
226.48 130 5
33 Rapid Battle Damage Assessment 67.94 39 3
34 KPP 4: Transportability
35 High Power Density and Fuel Efficient
Propulsion
90.59 52 3
36 KPP 5: Sustainability and Reliability
37 Embedded Predictive Logistic Sensors and
Algorithms
90.59 52 3
38 Water Generation and Purification 90.59 52 3
39 KPP 6: Training
40 Computer Generated Forces 22.65 13 3
41 Tactical Engagement Simulation 45.30 26 3
42 KPP 7: Survivability
43 Active Protection System 22.65 13 3
44 Signature Management 90.59 52 3
45 Lightweight hull and Vehicle Armour 10.45 6 3
46 Power Distribution and Control 10.45 6 3
47 Advanced Countermine Technology 226.48 130 5
48 High Density Packaged Power 10.45 6 3
49 1st Variant PDC (Preliminary Design Complete) 0.00 0 50
50 Last Variant PDC (Preliminary Design Complete) 0.00 0 51,53,77
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APPENDIX: Continued





107 IOT (Initial Operational Test) Phase 1 47.11 20 10,108
108 IOT Phase 2 44.76 19 113
109 Integration and Test Production 214.37 91 10,113
110 FUSL 244.99 104 113,11
111 Training and Fielding 244.99 104 113
112 IOTE 1 61.25 26 113
113 IOTE 2 30.62 13 11
114 Combat Systems Testing
115 Phase 1: LRIP Prime Items
116 Integration 634.15 39 118,122
117 LRIP PI for SoSIL 0.00 0 118
118 LRIP PI for TFT Delivered 0.00 0 119
119 Testing 211.38 13 120,123
120 Analysis 211.38 13 125,107,112
121 Phase 2: LRIP Late LRIP PI
122 Integration 520.33 32 124
123 LRIP PI for SoSIL 0.00 0 124
124 LRIP PI for TFT Delivered 0.00 0 125
125 Testing 211.38 13 126
126 Analysis 211.38 13 11,10
127 Production
128 Facilitation (Pre-LL Production) 833.33 65 129
129 Facilitation (LL Production) 1,166.67 91 133,117
130 Long Lead Lot 1 666.67 52 131,132,133,9,116,117
131 Lot 1 1,000.00 78 112,111
132 Lot 2 1,666.67 130 11,113
133 Lot 3 1,666.67 130 11,113
134 Notional End Task 0.00 0
ESTIMATING TOTAL PROGRAM COST
Page 58 Military Operations Research, V11 N4 2006
APPENDIX: GAO “C4ISR First”: Develop C4ISR Infrastructure First





1 Notional Start 0 0 24,13,3
2 Major Events
3 Milestone B Complete 0 0 4,67,37,29,25,14
4 SFR (System Functional Review) 0 0 5,26
5 SoS PDR Complete 0 0 6,16
6 SoS CDR Complete 0 0 7,17
7 Facilitation 0 0 8,95
8 LL IPR Waiver 0 0 9,97,21
9 IPD (Milestone C) 0 0 10,77
10 IOC 0 0 11,32
11 UA 0 0 101
12 SoS Definition and Design
13 Systems Engineering 571.43 104 5
14 Systems Design 1428.57 260 10
15 Prototype Systems Build and Test
16 1st Variant PDC (Preliminary Design
Complete)
0 0 17
17 Last Variant PDC (Preliminary Design
Complete)
0 0 18
18 Long Lead Prototype 800 52 19,20,21
19 Prototype Integration and Assembly 1200 78 22
20 First Variant CDC (Critical Design Complete) 0 0 95
21 Last Variant CDC (Critical Design Complete) 0 0 22
22 Final Prototype 0 0 57,69,97,96
23 C4ISR Software and Platform
24 SW Build 1 507.94 104 27,44
25 SW Build 2 634.92 130 27,34,69,31,46,52,59
26 SW Build 3 825.4 169 28,52,59
27 SW Build 4 571.43 117 9,63,59
28 SW Build 5 507.94 104 83,89,64
29 SIL Delivery 1 (System Integration Lab) 253.97 52 68,33,30
30 SIL Delivery 2 253.97 52 69,31,27,52
31 SIL Delivery 3 253.97 52 32,28
32 SW Update 190.48 39 11,80
33 Software PDR Complete 0 0 34,5
34 Software CDR Complete 0 0 6
35 Integrated Test Program
36 IPS1 (Integration Phase SDD 1)
37 SoSIL Development 280.99 51 38,39,30
38 Integration 71.63 13 41,5,40
39 Sims Delivered 0 0 40
40 IT and UT 71.63 13 42
41 TRR 0 0 42
42 Analysis 71.63 13 45,44
43 IPS2
44 Integration 280.99 51 47,6,46
45 Early Emulators Delivered 0 0 46
46 IT and UT 71.63 13 48
47 TRR 0 0 48
48 Analysis 71.63 13 50,51,28
49 IPS3
50 Integration 209.37 38 53,52
51 Initial DP Prime Items Delivered 0 0 52
52 IT and UT 71.63 13 54,55
53 TRR 0 0 54,55
54 Analysis 104.68 19 58,8
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APPENDIX: Continued





55 User Trial 11.02 2 57
56 IPS4
57 Integration 187.33 34 60,59
58 Initial System Deliveries 0 0 59
59 IT and UT 71.63 13 61,63,72
60 TRR 0 0 61
61 Analysis 71.63 13 9
62 IPS5
63 Integration 209.37 38 64
64 IMT 71.63 13 65
65 Analysis 71.63 13 77,100
66 SoS Testing and Integration
67 Phase 1: Integration and Test SDD
(Simulation)
183.75 78 70,5
68 Phase 2: HW and SW 214.37 91 6,95,57
69 Phase 3: Prototype 214.37 91 72
70 Integration and Qualification and Live Fire
Tests
489.99 208 73,9,76
71 Test Events and Milestones
72 LUT 1 4.71 2 73
73 LUT 2 4.71 2 77,79,74,98,99,76
74 IOT (Initial Operational Test) Phase 1 47.11 20 10,75
75 IOT Phase 2 44.76 19 80
76 Integration and Test Production 214.37 91 10,80
77 FUSL 244.99 104 80,11
78 Training and Fielding 244.99 104 80
79 IOTE 1 61.25 26 80
80 IOTE 2 30.62 13 11
81 Combat Systems Testing
82 Phase 1: LRIP Prime Items
83 Integration 634.15 39 85,89,100
84 LRIP PI for SoSIL 0 0 85
85 LRIP PI for TFT Delivered 0 0 86
86 Testing 211.38 13 87,90
87 Analysis 211.38 13 92,74,79
88 Phase 2: LRIP Late LRIP PI
89 Integration 520.33 32 91
90 LRIP PI for SoSIL 0 0 91
91 LRIP PI for TFT Delivered 0 0 92
92 Testing 211.38 13 93
93 Analysis 211.38 13 11,10,32
94 Production
95 Facilitation (Pre-LL Production) 682.93 52 100,84,96
96 Facilitation (LL Production) 1195.12 91 100,84
97 Long Lead Lot 1 682.93 52 98,99,100,9,83,84,76
98 Lot 1 1024.39 78 79,78
99 Lot 2 1707.32 130 11,80
100 Lot 3 1707.32 130 11,80
101 Notional End Task 0 0
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